Report on Provisional Ballots and American Elections by Shaw, Daron & Hutchings, Vincent
  
 
 
CALTECH/MIT 
VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT 
A multi-disciplinary, collaborative project of the California Institute of Technology – 
Pasadena, California 91125 and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology – 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139 
 
 
 
 
TITLE Report on Provisional Ballots and American Elections 
 
 
Name  Daron Shaw   
University University of Texas at Austin 
 
Name  Vincent Hutchings 
University University of Michigan  
 
 
 
 
This is one of a set of research papers prepared for The Presidential Commission on Election 
Administration.  The research reported in this paper represents the research, inferences and 
opinions of the authors, and not the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project nor the individual 
research members of the VTP. 
 
 
VTP WORKING PAPER #115 
June 21, 2013 
Provisional Ballot Report Page 1 
 
REPORT ON PROVISIONAL BALLOTS AND AMERICAN ELECTIONS 
 
Prepared by 
 
Professor Daron Shaw 
University of Texas at Austin 
 
Professor Vincent Hutchings 
University of Michigan 
 
 
 
For the Presidential Commission on Election Administration 
 
June 21, 2013 
 
Overview 
 
Both empirical and anecdotal data indicate that the use of provisional ballots in U.S. 
elections is a mixed bag. On the one hand, providing voters whose eligibility is unclear with 
an opportunity to cast a provisional ballot might prevent many voters from being 
disenfranchised. Indeed, the evidence from several states (for example, in California 
provisional ballots were estimated to be 5.8% of all ballots cast in 2008) indicates that the 
incidence of disputed eligibility can be quite substantial, and that provisional balloting 
options are substantively important. On the other hand, those states with provisional 
balloting systems may be less likely to seek to improve their registration, voter list, and 
election administration procedures, as provisional ballots provide a “fail-safe” option.  
We assume that the goal here is to (a) reduce incidences in which voter eligibility is 
at issue, and (b) provide an opportunity for all eligible voters to participate. In light of these 
goals, we recommend the best practices identified in the U.S. Election Assistance 
Commission’s 2010 report on provisional voting: improving voter 
outreach/communication, adding to staff and poll worker training, encouraging more 
consistent and comprehensive Election Day management procedures, and strengthening 
procedures for offering and counting provisional ballots as well as upgrading post-election 
statistical systems.1 These recommendations respect differences between and amongst the 
states, but provide a pathway for achieving consistency within states and improving voting 
procedures across the board.  
We also recommend that provisional ballot procedures are consistent within a given 
state, that younger voters be targeted for outreach, that provisional voting data be 
integrated into the voter lists and analyzed to inform outreach, and that both Election Day 
and (especially) post-election procedures for using and counting provisional ballots be 
strictly defined, understood, and implemented by election administrators.   
 
 
                                                        
1 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY OVERVIEW REPORT (2010). 
Provisional Ballot Report Page 2 
 
Introduction 
 
In this report, we focus exclusively on the issue of provisional ballots2. Although the 
history of provisional balloting in the United States goes back into at least the last century, 
the underlying issues of voter eligibility and election administration came to the fore in the 
aftermath of the 2000 presidential election. In 2000, half of the states offered provisional 
ballots to individuals not on the rolls, allowing voter eligibility to be verified after Election 
Day. Florida, however, was not one of these states. In response to the public outcry 
following the controversial resolution to the 2000 presidential contest, Congress passed 
the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002 in an effort to avoid similar problems in the 
future. Specifically, HAVA mandated that each state3 allow voters whose eligibility is 
questioned to cast a provisional ballot which can be examined after the election.4 Section 
302 of HAVA “creates the right for potential voters to cast provisional ballots in the event 
their names do not appear on the registration list or the voters’ eligibility is challenged by 
an election official.”5 
In 2004, the first year HAVA-mandated provisional ballots were used, 
approximately 1.9 million were submitted across the country; 65 percent of them were 
found eligible and counted. In 2006, nearly 800,000 provisional ballots were submitted; 80 
percent were counted.6 In 2008, data analyzed by the Pew Center on the States revealed 
that more than two million voters who showed up at the polls did not cast regular ballots 
for various reasons. More than 600,000 of these voters’ provisional ballots did not count, 
while more than 1.4 million voters (1.2 percent of all ballots cast for president) were able 
to have all or part of their votes counted through provisional ballots.7 (See Table 1 for 2008 
and 2010 provisional ballot estimates by state.).8  
 
 
 
Scope of the Possible Problem 
 
Provisional ballots are important because they offer voters who otherwise would be 
denied the right to vote an opportunity to cast a ballot—at least in many cases. Still, a major 
problem in attempting to evaluate the performance of an election administration system 
based on the use of provisional ballots is that use of provisional ballots alone can mean any 
number of things.  
                                                        
2 Throughout our report, we rely heavily on a review of the literature and preliminary report prepared by 
Salvador Perez, a law student at Stanford University, to whom we are greatly indebted. All errors, omissions, 
and mistakes are attributable solely to the authors. 
3 Four states do not use provisional ballots—Idaho, New Hampshire and Minnesota—are exempt because 
they have Election Day registration. A fifth, North Dakota, is exempt because it does not have voter 
registration altogether. 
4 HAVA P.L. 107-252, Sec. 302 
5 HAVA P.L. 107-252, Sec. 302 
6 PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: AN IMPERFECT SOLUTION 2 (2009). 
7 Id. at 3. 
8 Official 2012 provisional ballot figures for all fifty states are not yet available. We do have self-reports of 
provisional ballot rates based on survey data, which indicate that 0.4% of all ballots were provisional. These 
numbers almost certainly understate both the rate and the total number of ballots, however.  
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For example, a high rate of usage could represent a vigorous attempt to ensure that 
no votes are lost while simultaneously providing protection against fraud because the 
ballots will be subjected to scrutiny before being counted. So, provisional ballots might 
represent a well-functioning “fail-safe” mechanism to reduce disenfranchisement. But they 
might also indicate the opposite: a high rate of usage could suggest significant problems 
with a registration system that is not properly recording the names of registrants, 
informing those with missing information that they need to update or correct the records, 
transmitting the names on time to be included in poll books, or preparing the poll books.  
A similar uncertainty is associated with the rate of acceptance of provisional ballots. 
On the one hand, a high rate of acceptance could represent a functioning provisional ballot 
system, working to count the ballots of those who the registration system failed. On the 
other hand, a low rate of acceptance might also signal a system that is working well by 
keeping those not eligible to vote from doing so. 
Essentially, given the data available at the moment, it is difficult to state with any 
sense of definitiveness whether there is a problem in our provisional ballot systems—
much less to depict with any accuracy the exact scope of the problem. Indeed, any measure 
of provisional ballot usage is an imperfect measure of policy success. Nonetheless, there is 
much value in acknowledging what we do and do not know.  
 
 
What We Do Know 
 
State Variation  
HAVA left states with a great deal of latitude in creating and managing their 
provisional voting processes. Indeed, prominent experts have described HAVA’s language 
that relates to implementation as somewhat convoluted and responsible for uncertainty, 
controversy, and litigation. This, in turn, has led to a great deal of variation in how 
provisional ballots are issued and counted. Indeed, provisional voting measures vary based 
on state laws and practice, local practice, demographic characteristics of the precinct, and 
political factors.9 10 
Provisional ballots are issued for a variety of reasons, including: voter’s name is not 
on the registration list, voter does not have proper identification, a voter has moved within 
the county, a vote is recorded as having already been cast, or polling place hours are 
extended beyond regular hours.11  
The variation in issuance of provisional ballots is such that four states—California, 
New York, Ohio, and Arizona—account for the lion’s share (two-thirds, in fact) of all 
provisional ballots submitted. Similarly, the acceptance and counting of provisional ballots 
also varies considerably. Ten states, for example, counted more than 75 percent of their 
provisional ballots, while 17 states counted less than 45 percent.12 
                                                        
9 See David C. Kimball, Martha Kropf & Lindsay Battles, Helping America Vote? Election Administration, 
Partisanship, and Provisional Voting in the 2004 Election, 5 ELECTION L.J. 447 (2006). 
10 L. PAIGE WHITAKER & ARTHUR TRALDI, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, STATE ELECTION LAWS: OVERVIEW OF 
STATUTES PROVIDING FOR PROVISIONAL BALLOT TABULATION (2004). 
11 PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: AN IMPERFECT SOLUTION 2 (2009).  
12 Id. 
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Using data from the 2008 election, we see in Table 1 that the rate of provisional 
ballot usage ranged from 0.01 percent in Wisconsin and Vermont to a maximum of 6.5 
percent in Arizona and the District of Columbia. Two other states had provisional ballot 
usage rates at or near 6 percent of total ballots cast: Alaska (6.2 percent) and California (5.8 
percent). Rounding out the “top-ten” provisional ballot states, we see Utah (4.5 percent), 
Ohio (3.6 percent), Kansas (3.2 percent), Colorado (2.2 percent), and Maryland (1.9 
percent). Overall, the average usage rate across the 40 states for which we have data was 
1.4 percent. Provisional ballot acceptance rates vary even more widely across the states. 
Maine, Vermont, and Wisconsin accepted virtually all of their provisional ballots while 
Delaware, Hawaii, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Virginia accepted almost none of their 
provisional ballots. 
In addition, many states with the highest provisional ballots cast rates also had 
relatively high acceptance rates. For example, in 2008 6.2 percent of Alaskans cast 
provisional ballots, and about 98 percent of these provisional votes were accepted. In that 
same election, Utah’s rates were 4.5 and 84 percent, respectively. California’s were 5.8 and 
83 percent. Ohio’s were 3.6 and 81 percent. The District of Columbia’s were 6.5 and 72 
percent. Arizona’s were 6.5 and 71 percent. The relationship was not perfect—most 
notably, some states with low provisional ballot rates also had high acceptance rates for 
those ballots—but it is the case that in both 2008 and 2010 states with high provisional 
voting rates were also likely to count those ballots. 
 
Midterms vs. Presidential Elections  
Comparing usage and acceptance in 2010 versus 2008, experts have found that (a) 
usage rates were highly correlated (that is, states with high usage rates in 2008 had high 
usage rates in 2010), and (b) usage rates were lower in almost every state in 2010.13 With 
regard to acceptance, a large majority of the states had higher rates in 2010 than in 2008. 
Though a variety of factors might explain this, it is likely that mid-term voters are more 
engaged, more likely to follow up and provide any necessary documents to ensure their 
ballots would be counted. Additionally, verification might be easier in a midterm election 
from the perspective of election officials. A smaller turnout and smaller number of 
provisional ballots might make it easier for officials to verify registration status. Lower 
stakes in mid-term elections would also suggest greater laxity in counting provisional 
ballots as acceptable.  
 
Effect of Specific Triggers 
In states that issue a provisional ballot when an individual requested an absentee 
ballot but did not vote, the usage rate is nearly three times as high as in states that do not 
use this trigger (1.59 percent vs. 0.54 percent) and the acceptance rate is 17 percentage 
points higher (71.17 percent vs. 54.03 percent). The results for accepting ballots cast in the 
wrong precinct are even more striking. The 21 states that allow for this have a usage rate 
four times higher than states that do not (1.56 percent vs. 0.39 percent) and an acceptance 
rate 27 percentage points higher than the 24 states that do not count provisional ballots 
cast in the wrong precinct (74.92 percent vs. 47.89 percent).14 
                                                        
13 Id. at 4-17. 
14 Id. 
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Date at Which Provisional Ballots Were Adopted  
One key factor found to influence provisional voting is when the state adopted 
provisional voting. The rate of provisional voting usage and acceptance is substantially 
higher in the states that had previous experience with provisional voting. With respect to 
usage, the states that had some variant of fail-safe voting in 2001 (before HAVA) had an 
average usage rate of 1.38 percent compared to 0.34 percent—nearly four times larger.15 
Moreover, the acceptance rates were quite different when comparing the two groups of 
states. States with fail-safe voting before HAVA had an average acceptance rate of 68.56 
percent compared to 46.68 percent for those who instituted provisional voting in the wake 
of HAVA—a difference of nearly 22 percentage points.16  
 
Local Variation  
Variation among the states also extends to variation within the states. In Florida, for 
example, some of the state’s most populous counties saw significantly different counting 
rates. In Duval County, more than 80 percent of provisional ballots were counted while 
fewer than 60 percent were counted in Hillsborough County. In south Florida, about 33 
percent were counted in Miami-Dade and just over six percent were counted in Broward 
County.17 The extent of such variation has led some observers to express concern about the 
potentially different treatment of voters who should be subject to the same rules within the 
same state.18 
 
Voter Registration 
Following the 2008 election, Pew was able to collect data on why 460,000 
provisional ballots were rejected. More than 200,000 of these were rejected because the 
person was not registered in the state (while some likely never registered, it is possible 
that at some point between registering and attempting to cast a ballot, many experienced 
an error due to outdated, inefficient registration systems).19 These data, however, only 
offer a partial view of what took place in 2008 with regard to provisional ballots. 
 
Voting Information  
In 2008, 30 states and the District of Columbia rejected provisional ballots if they 
were cast in the wrong precinct.20 Nationally, more than 50,000 provisional ballots were 
rejected for being cast in the wrong precinct.21 These data points suggest that voters 
possibly lacked the information they needed to verify their registration, their precinct and 
polling place prior to Election Day. Voters also may have been provided the incorrect 
polling place in advance or redirected to the wrong one on Election Day due to 
administrative errors.  
 
                                                        
15 Id. at 4-19 
16 Id. 
17 PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: AN IMPERFECT SOLUTION 2-3 (2009).  
18 Id. at 3.  
19 Id. 
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
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Consistent Rates of Usage & Acceptance Across Years  
As we await finalized data from the 2012 election, there is little difference in the 
overall results across the four post-HAVA elections for which we have data (2004, 2006, 
2008, 2010). For one, though the mean is higher in the presidential election (1.5 percent 
versus 1 percent), within election type (presidential versus mid-term) the mean usage rate 
is roughly the same across years.22 The story remains the same when looking to the 
unsuccessful provisional vote rate—in both 2010 and 2006 the mean rate was 0.2 percent 
(the median was 0.1 percent).  
 
Demographic Differences in Provisional Voting 
 Survey data indicate that certain kinds of voters are more likely to encounter 
problems at the polls, and to cast a provisional ballot. The 2012 Cooperative Congressional 
Election Study, an online poll featuring approximately 50,000 respondents and over 40,000 
voters, shows that 2.0 percent of people who attempted to vote experienced some sort of 
problem, and that 18.7 percent of these people ended up casting a provisional ballot (see 
Table 2). Among those under 30 years of age, however, 4.6 percent experienced a problem 
and 27.6 percent of those cast a provisional ballot. Similarly, there seem to be differences 
by race and ethnicity: 3.1 percent of Blacks experienced an issue when attempting to vote, 
with 27.0 percent of these casting a provisional ballot. For Hispanics, these numbers were 
3.0 percent and 30.0 percent, respectively. Interestingly, the small sample of Asian 
respondents suggests that voting problems and provisional ballots may be an even greater 
issue with that population. These data correspond to some studies that rely on aggregate-
level data from different counties to assess the relationship between race/ethnicity and the 
occurrence of eligibility issues and the use of provisional ballots.  
It is unclear, however, whether differences in age, education, income, and language 
are driving racial and ethnic differences, or whether race and ethnicity are critical in and of 
themselves. Most notably, racial and ethnic minority populations tend to be relatively 
younger and (with some important exceptions) slightly less educated, so it may be that the 
relationship between provisional ballots cast and race and ethnicity are spurious. To gain 
some leverage on this issue, we estimate a statistical model where the effects of race, 
ethnicity, age, and education on casting a provisional ballot in 2012 are assessed. The 
dominant factor turns out to be age: those under thirty years of age were, all things held 
equal, 25 points more likely to have cast a provisional ballot in 2012. In contrast, those 
over sixty-five years of age were 6 points less likely to have cast a provisional ballot. 
Perhaps more to the point, the effects of race and ethnicity diminish dramatically once age 
is taken into account: Blacks were more likely to have cast a provisional ballot in 2012 than 
non-Blacks, but only by about a point and a half. Similarly, Latinos were 1.2 points more 
likely to have cast a provisional ballot in 2012 than non-Latinos.23  
   
 
  
                                                        
22 Hanmer & Herrnson, supra note 10, at 4-14.  
23 Results are predicted probabilities derived from a logistic regression of casting a provisional ballot in the 
2012 election (self-reported).  
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What We Don’t Know  
 
In one word: lots. As the Pew Center on the States itself has acknowledged, the data 
currently available, while informative, are incomplete “because a number of states do not 
collect consistent information and could not provide complete county-level information.”24 
Precinct-level data, for example, on exactly why provisional ballots are issued and why they 
are rejected could offer more insight into the differences in the ways poll workers interpret 
and actually administer provisional ballot rules.  
Provisional ballot submission and acceptance rates are not independent of one 
another and are related to other aspects of election administration. To evaluate measures 
of provisional voting, both usage and acceptance should be considered together, along 
with: “(1) the reasons for usage; (2) reasons for counting; and (3) number of people who 
declined to accept a provisional ballot when offered one.”25 In addition, there remains 
much to be discovered with respect to the relationship between key demographic 
characteristics and provisional voting. Data on the quality of the voter registration 
databases would also be useful, especially when measures of provisional ballot usage could 
be examined as a function of changes in the quality of the registration databases.26 
Some progress has been made on these issues. Most notably, EAVS data from 2010 
provide a broad look at why provisional ballots were rejected. These data show that 
provisional ballots were rejected because the voter was not registered in the state (45 
percent), registered but in the wrong jurisdiction (7 percent), registered but in the wrong 
precinct (11 percent), failed to provide identification (2 percent), submitted an incomplete 
or illegible ballot or envelope (4 percent), or other reasons (32 percent). Unpacking these 
other reasons deserves further attention.27 
 
 
Possible Solutions 
 
Some of those who have studied provisional voting suggest sweeping changes that 
go well beyond the scope of the current commission. For example, The Pew Center on the 
States proposes (1) simplifying the provisional ballot process by standardizing it across the 
country, (2) establishing Election Day registration, and (3) modernizing the voter 
registration system and automatically registering all eligible voters.28  
Given the commission’s mandate, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission offers 
perhaps a more practical set of useful solutions in its 2006 report, “Best Practices on 
Provisional Voting.” Among the recommendations are: (1) focusing on voter outreach and 
communication (including online communication) prior to Election Day, (2) offering more 
formal, standardized, and comprehensive staff and poll worker training, (3) a greater 
emphasis on Election Day management procedures and protocols, and (4) strengthening 
                                                        
24 PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: AN IMPERFECT SOLUTION 5 (2009). 
25 Hanmer & Herrnson, supra note 10, at 4-8. 
26 Id. at 16. 
27 Id. at 20. 
28 PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: AN IMPERFECT SOLUTION 5 (2009).  
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procedures for offering and counting provisional ballots, and upgrading post-election 
statistical systems.29  
 Based on our reading of the literature as well as well as our own research and 
analysis, we would add a few additional recommendations.  
 
 As detailed earlier in this report, there are states in which the handling of 
provisional ballots varies from county to county (for example, Florida in 2008). We 
would strongly recommend that provisional ballot standards within a state be 
consistent.  
 Our analysis of survey data indicates that younger voters are particularly likely to 
face eligibility issues that result in a provisional ballot being cast. Voter education 
and information should therefore target these first-time and “under thirty” voters. 
 States often fail to preserve individual-level data on provisional ballots for post-
election analysis. These data would be extremely useful for identifying (and helping) 
those who are most likely to have trouble at the polls. Post-cards could be sent to 
those who cast a provisional ballot in the last election reminding them to update 
their registration status and telling them where their current polling place is.  
 Election Day is not the day for training, nor is it the proper day for lengthy 
adjudication of disputed claims. Election Day poll workers need to be provided with 
clear criteria for identifying an eligible voter or, conversely, for allowing a 
provisional ballot to be cast by someone who does not meet the eligibility criteria. 
Disputed claims need to be resolved quickly to accommodate others seeking to cast 
their ballots. 
 Post-election consideration of provisional ballots presents an opportunity for more 
organized, deliberative processes. This is where time can be taken to ascertain 
eligibility. Our main concerns are that this deliberation be objective, impartial, and 
swift. Objectivity means that standards for determining eligibility and whether a 
provisional ballot will be accepted need to be understood prior to the election and 
implemented by administrators after Election Day. Impartiality is critical because 
the fact that administrators know the preliminary outcome creates a potential issue 
(counting ballots can be polluted by the fact that both partisan sides know how 
many votes they need to win). Swiftness is important so that election disputes can 
be resolved, duly-elected officials can represent their constituents at the beginning 
of legislative and executive terms, and the public can have confidence that their 
electoral system functions.  
                                                        
29 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY OVERVIEW REPORT (2010). 
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1. Appendix 1—Salient News Coverage from the 2012 Election 
 
2. Andy Marso, “Bill Shrouding Provisional Ballots Heads to Governor,” The Topeka 
Capital-Journal, 7 April 2013. 
Available at: http://cjonline.com/news/2013-04-07/bill-shrouding-provisional-
ballots-heads-governor 
 
Author reports on ongoing litigation and proposed legislation regarding disclosure 
of the names of provisional voters in a hotly-contested Kansas House race. Four 
months after Ken Corbet narrowly unseated Ann Mah for the Kansas House 54th 
District seat, the race continued to reverberate through the halls of the Statehouse 
and a federal court. Before adjourning until May, the House and Senate passed a bill 
barring disclosure of information about voters who cast provisional ballots — a bill 
largely inspired by Mah.  Mah, a Democrat, found herself trailing the Republican 
Corbet by 27 votes out of more than 10,000 cast on election night last November. 
The race wasn’t over: 104 Shawnee County voters in her district had cast 
provisional ballots — ballots that had to be reviewed by county canvassers before 
they could be counted — and there were more 54th District provisional voters in 
Osage and Douglas Counties. With about 10 days before the canvass, Mah contacted 
county officials seeking the names of provisional voters so she could contact them. 
 
 
3. Meghan Millea, “O’Farrell Files Suit to Contest Vote Count,” Times Reporter, 26 
December 2012. 
Available at: http://cjonline.com/news/2013-04-07/bill-shrouding-provisional-
ballots-heads-governor 
 
Author reports on ongoing litigation regarding a hotly-contested Ohio House race. 
Josh O’Farrell, the Democratic challenger for the Ohio House of Representatives 
98th District, filed a lawsuit to contest the election with the state Supreme Court. 
The complaint involves several provisional and absentee ballots that were rejected 
by the Tuscarawas County Board of Elections, and were not included when the 
board certified the election Dec. 14. O’Farrell lost to Republican incumbent Al Landis 
by eight votes, with Landis leading 23,393 votes to 23,385, in both Tuscarawas and 
Holmes counties. 
 
 
4. Darrel Rowland, “Husted Illegally Tossing Provisional Ballots, Dems Say,” The 
Columbus Dispatch, 28 November 2012. 
Available at: http://dispatchpolitics.dispatch.com/content/blogs/the-daily-
briefing/2012/11/28-november-2012---dems-on-prov-ballots.html  
 
Author reports on dispute involving counting of provisional ballots in two hotly-
contested Ohio House races that triggered automatic recounts. In Tuscarawas 
County, Dover Rep. Al Landis’ lead in the 98th District race has been trimmed to just 
14 votes out of more than 47,000 cast over Democrat Josh O'Farrell. In Cuyahoga 
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County, Rep. Mike Dovilla, R-Berea, led Democrat Matt Patten by 119 votes. If 
Democrats lose both races, Republicans - who easily control the Senate - will have 
large enough majorities to put constitutional amendments on the ballot without a 
single Democratic vote. Democrats lobbied complaints against GOP Secretary of 
State Husted.  
 
 
5. Matt Dixon, “New Law Sparks Increase in Use of Provisional Ballots in Florida 
Counties,” The Florida Times-Union, 19 November 2012. 
Available at: http://jacksonville.com/news/metro/2012-11-18/story/new-law-
sparks-increase-use-provisional-ballots-florida-counties  
 
Author reports on new trigger requiring use of provisional ballot. County officials 
say a new election law sparked the flood of people who needed to cast provisional 
ballots, which are used when a voter’s eligibility is in question and are not always 
counted. Clay County normally sees about 20 of these ballots. This year, the number 
ballooned to nearly 400. An election law passed in 2011 required voters who moved 
to a new county and did not change their address before voting to use a provisional 
ballot. Before that, Florida voters had been able to change their address on Election 
Day. 
 
 
6. Daniel Denvir, “Registered Philly Voters Required to Cast Provisional Ballots in 
Large Numbers,” Philadelphia City Paper, 6 November 2012. 
Available at: http://www.citypaper.net/blogs/nakedcity/177510161.html 
 
Author reports on disruptions that occurred in Philadelphia on Election Day. The 
names of registered Philadelphia voters did not show up on voter rolls and poll 
workers instructed them to vote using provisional ballots, according to voters and 
poll workers in West and North Philadelphia. Provisional ballots, if they are counted, 
are not counted until days after the election. “We think it's a real concern,” said a 
staffer at The Committee of Seventy, which monitors elections in Philadelphia. Voter 
ID, he says, is “not the central problem in Philadelphia today: [it's] the messy 
administration of this election. The phones are just ringing off the hook. We're 
fielding calls about people who are not in the polling books.” Some poll workers did 
not even instruct people that they could file provisional ballots, and other voters 
reportedly just walked away in frustration. 
 
 
7. Joe Guillen, “Ohio’s Complicated Process for Counting Provisional Ballots Could 
Decide the Presidency,” The Plain Dealer, 6 November 2012. 
Available at: 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/11/ohios_complicated_process_f
or.html 
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Author details the process by which provisional ballots are counted in Ohio and 
partisan consideration that could have marred such a process. The process could 
play out slowly and painstakingly over the next couple weeks, and in the end, 
Republican Secretary of State Jon Husted ultimately could be the person who 
decides which provisional ballots must be counted and which will be tossed. “That 
will get dicey,” said Edward Foley, director of Election Law @ Moritz, a program at 
the Ohio State University’s Moritz College of Law. “That just shows a structural 
weakness in our system.” 
 
 
8. Darrel Rowland, “Husted Trying to Unfairly Toss Out Votes, Court Filing Says,” The 
Columbus Dispatch, 3 November 2012. 
Available at: http://dispatchpolitics.dispatch.com/content/blogs/the-daily-
briefing/2012/11/3-november-2012---emergency-court-motion.html 
 
Author reports on filling submitted by plaintiffs in a federal suit against Ohio 
Secretary State. The plaintiffs, the Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless, 
wanted Judge Marbley to clarify that a provisional vote would still count even if it 
lacks information that a poll worker was supposed to provide. 
 
 
 
9. Amanda Becker, “Ohio Fights on Early Voting, Provisional Ballots,” Roll Call, 11 
October 2012. 
Available at: http://www.rollcall.com/issues/58_28/Ohio-Fights-on-Early-Voting-
Provisional-Ballots-218133-1.html?pos=htmbph  
 
Author outlines disputes in Ohio related to voting procedures. In particular, the 
author details SEIU suit against GOP Secretary of State Husted. The Service 
Employees International Union challenged the state’s refusal to count ballots cast in 
the wrong precinct as a result of poll worker error. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit was expected to weigh in on that case within the next week, and the 
decision could lead to another high court appeal. There was a great deal at stake in 
Ohio for Obama and Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney, both of whom 
focused on the perennial battleground state as the race narrowed to just a handful 
of states. 
 
 
10. Rick Hasen, “Breaking News: Sixth Circuit Decides Provisional Ballot Cases, Finds 
Constitutional Violation in Not Counting Certain Wrong Precinct Ballots,” Election 
Law Blog, 11 October 2012. 
Available at: http://electionlawblog.org/?p=41452  
 
Author reports on Sixth Circuit decision: “This is the most important decision in this 
election cycle, and it represents a major victory for voters’ rights, regardless of 
party.  It is especially important because this was a very conservative Sixth Circuit 
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panel, and it affirms the idea that Bush v. Gore and Sixth Circuit precedent requires 
some degree of uniformity and fairness in the counting of ballots.” “I also think this 
opinion can be very important as precedent in future cases in stopping the most 
egregious poor treatment of voters going forward.” 
 
 
 
  
Provisional Ballot Report Page 13 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
1. Edward B. Foley, The Promise and Problems of Provisional Voting, 73 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1701 (2005). 
 
 Offers an informative account of the competing views leading to HAVA’s provisional 
ballot section that provides a useful perspective for understanding the empirical 
work on provisional voting. He reveals that HAVA’s provisional voting section was a 
compromise between “substantive” and “procedural” views of provisional voting. He 
describes the substantive view as one that leads to a system that as a practical 
matter allows Election Day registration. That is, whether an attempt to register was 
associated with a mistake in the process of pre-election day registration or even if 
one never tried to register before Election Day, those who hold this view argue that 
anyone who meets the basic criteria for registration can cast a provisional ballot and 
have it counted. The procedural view takes a stricter stance on whose provisional 
ballot can be counted. More specifically, those who hold this view argue that only 
those who were officially registered to vote by the closing date for registration but 
due to some mistake with the voter list should have their provisional ballot counted.  
 
 He goes on to note that though the procedural view (generally preferred by the U.S. 
Senate) ultimately won out over the substantive view (generally preferred by the 
U.S. House of Representatives) that the language in HAVA leaves open the 
opportunity for the substantive view to prevail. 
 
 
2. EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY & THE MORITZ COLLEGE OF LAW, OHIO 
STATE UNIVERSITY, REPORT TO U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION ON BEST PRACTICES TO 
IMPROVE PROVISIONAL VOTING (2006).  
 
 A key factor by which provisional voting measures vary is previous history of 
provisional voting, i.e. whether the states adopted provisional ballot procedures on 
their own or if they were imposed by the federal government via HAVA. 
 
 A number of other factors related to state law and practice both directly and 
indirectly related to provisional voting influence provisional ballot usage and 
acceptance. As expected due to the benefit of added technology, states with 
statewide voter registration databases were less likely to issue provisional ballots in 
2004. Found that voter registration databases reduced the acceptance rate in states 
using provisional ballots for the first time. 
 
 States with shorter time periods set to examine the provisional ballots tended to 
accept fewer provisional ballots. 
 
 
Provisional Ballot Report Page 14 
 
3. David C. Kimball, Martha Kropf & Lindsay Battles, Helping America Vote? 
Election Administration, Partisanship, and Provisional Voting in the 2004 Election, 
5 ELECTION L.J. 447 (2006). 
 
 Provides evidence based on the 2004 elections that provisional ballots were more 
likely to be submitted and counted in the states that had fail-safe voting mechanisms 
in place prior to the enactment of HAVA. 
 
 States that are subject to pre-clearance under the Voting Rights Act tended to accept 
fewer provisional ballots. 
 
 The decentralization of election administration within states gives local election 
officials latitude in administering state and federal regulations. Perhaps the most 
concerning factor found to influence provisional ballot usage and acceptance is the 
partisanship of election officials. Authors note that discretion is a simply part of the 
process of issuing and counting provisional ballot. They first look to the rule 
creation stage, finding suggestive evidence that Democratic officials tend to adopt 
more permissive standards. At the issuing and counting stages they find that the 
interplay between the partisanship of the elected official and the partisanship of the 
electorate is an important influence. They show that as jurisdictions lean more 
toward one party the number of ballots issued and accepted increases when the 
election official is of the same party and decreases when the election official is a 
member of the other party. 
 
 The use of provisional ballots rises as the number of ballots cast increase. 
 
 The rate of provisional ballot usage decreases as the percent 65 and older and as 
median income increases. 
 
 With respect to acceptance, authors find that the number of ballots counted 
decreases as residential mobility increases, and as the percent 65 and older 
increases. 
 
 
4. Charles Stewart III, Early-and-Late-Adopters of Provisional Ballots, in PEW CENTER ON 
THE STATES, PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: AN IMPERFECT SOLUTION (2009). 
 
 Uses a different measure of experience and examines provisional voting across 
several election cycles, he draws similar conclusions. He finds that states such as 
California that had liberal fail-safe voting laws prior to the enactment of HAVA 
typically had the highest provisional ballot rates, followed by states such as Ohio 
that had more limited regulations. States that made no accommodations for 
provisional voting prior to HAVA, such as Florida, had the lowest usage rates. His 
interpretation of these results was quite clear: “it defies credulity to claim that the 
states that had adopted provisional ballots before 2000 are now five times worse in 
Provisional Ballot Report Page 15 
 
handling voter registration than the states that adopted provisional ballots after 
HAVA.” 
 
 
5. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY 
OVERVIEW REPORT (2010). 
 
 The states differ considerably in terms of the rules associated with providing and 
counting provisional ballots. Lists seven items that at least five states have to trigger 
use of a provisional ballot. The reasons and their frequency follow: name not on 
registration list (all 45 states that are not exempt from HAVA’s provisional voting 
requirement); voter does not have proper identification (34 states); voter is 
challenged as ineligible (26 states); voting hours were extended (22 states); 
requested an absentee ballot but it was not yet cast (17 states); voter eligibility 
cannot be immediately established (13 states); and error in party listing on 
registration record (11 states).  
 
 Another key difference comes at the counting stage, where twenty states reported 
that provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct would not be counted, four states 
indicated that provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct but correct county 
would be counted, seven states reported that provisional ballots cast in the wrong 
precinct would not be counted, and a number of states highlighted circumstances in 
which provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct would be counted. 
 
 
6. Michael R. Alvarez & Thad E. Hall, Provisional Ballots in the 2008 Ohio General 
Election, in PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: AN IMPERFECT SOLUTION 
(2009). 
 
 The use of provisional ballots rises as residential mobility and non-white population 
increases.  
 
 
7. David C. Kimball & Edward B. Foley, Unsuccessful Provisional Voting in the 2008 
General Election, in PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: AN IMPERFECT 
SOLUTION (2009). 
 
 The use of provisional ballots rises as population growth and percentage of 
population that is Hispanic increases. 
 
 The unsuccessful provisional voting rate increases as the size of the population 
increases, and as the percent black and the percent Hispanic increase. 
 
8. Michael C. Herron & Daniel A. Smith, Florida’s 2012 General Election under HB 1355: 
Early Voting, Provisional Ballots, and Absentee Ballots, University of Florida Working 
Provisional Ballot Report Page 16 
 
Paper (2012). 
 
 African Americans and Hispanic voters were more likely than white voters to cast 
provisional ballots and nearly twice as likely to have their provisional ballots 
rejected.  
 
  
Provisional Ballot Report Page 17 
 
Table 1—Provisional Ballots Cast and Accepted, 2008 and 2010 
 
 
Provisional Ballots Provisional Ballots Provisional Ballots Provisional Ballots
Cast Rejected Cast Rejected
Alabama Inc. Inc. 0.20% 0.10%
Alaska 6.20% 0.10% 0.30% 0.00%
Arizona 6.50% 1.90% 0.10% 0.0%
Arkansas 0.20% Inc. 0.20% 0.10%
California 5.80% 1.00% N/A N/A
Colorado 2.20% 0.30% 0.03% 0.02%
Connecticut 0.04% 0.03% 0.10% 0.10%
Delaware 0.10% 0.10% 0.10% 0.04%
District of Columbia 6.50% 1.80% 0.10% 0.10%
Florida 0.40% 0.20% 0.20% 0.03%
Georgia 0.40% 0.20% 2.10% 0.60%
Hawaii 0.10% 0.10% N/A N/A
Idaho N/A N/A 0.10% 0.10%
Illinois Inc. Inc. 0.30% 0.10%
Indiana Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc.
Iowa 0.30% 0.02% 5.20% 0.60%
Kansas 3.20% 1.00% 2.70% 0.30%
Kentucky 0.05% 0.04% 0.01% 0.01%
Louisiana 0.40% 0.20% 0.01% 0.01%
Maine 0.04% 0.00% 5.00% 0.50%
Maryland 1.90% 0.60% 0.80% 0.20%
Massachusetts 0.40% 0.30% N/A N/A
Michigan 0.10% 0.04% 4.00% 0.30%
Minnesota N/A N/A 0.20% 0.1%
Mississippi Inc. Inc. 0.02% 0.02%
Missouri 0.20% 0.20% 0.02% 0.00%
Montana 0.80% 0.02% 2.20% 0.20%
Nebraska 1.90% 0.40% 0.20% 0.10%
Nevada 0.70% 0.40% 0.70% 0.03%
New Hampshire N/A N/A Inc. 0.20%
New Jersey 1.80% 0.50% N/A N/A
New Mexico 0.80% Inc. 0.04% 0.03%
New York Inc. Inc. 0.30% 0.20%
North Carolina 1.20% 0.60% 1.00% 0.20%
North Dakota N/A N/A 0.00% 0.00%
Ohio 3.60% 0.70% Inc. Inc.
Oklahoma 0.20% 0.20% 0.03% 0.00%
Oregon 0.20% Inc. 3.00% 0.50%
Pennsylvania 0.50% 0.20% 2.00% 0.20%
Rhode Island 0.20% 0.10% Inc. 0.40%
South Carolina 0.50% 0.30% Inc. Inc.
South Dakota 0.10% 0.04% 0.20% 0.10%
Tennessee 0.20% 0.10% 0.10% 0.10%
Texas 0.50% 0.40% 1.10% 0.20%
Utah 4.50% 0.70% 1.00% 0.40%
Vermont 0.01% 0.00% 4.70% 0.80%
Virginia 0.20% 0.20% 0.10% 0.10%
Washington 1.80% 0.40% 0.40% 0.20%
West Virginia Inc. Inc. 0.01% 0.00%
Wisconsin 0.01% 0.00% 0.20% 0.10%
Wyoming N/A N/A N/A N/A
20102008
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Table 2—Provisional Voting Rates in 2012 by Sub-Groups 
 
 
 
 
   Source: Data are from the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. 
 
 
 
 
 
No Yes
No, I was 
not 
allowed to 
vote
I was allowed to 
vote using a 
provisional ballot I voted
Provisional 
Votes
TOTAL 98.0% 2.0% 40,166       12.7% 18.7% 68.6% 795 0.371%
Male 98.1% 1.9% 19,424       11.5% 16.0% 72.5% 357          0.293%
Female 97.9% 2.1% 20,742       13.7% 21.0% 65.3% 438          0.444%
18-29 95.4% 4.6% 4,021         18.4% 27.6% 54.1% 185          1.268%
30-44 97.3% 2.7% 4,738         14.7% 24.8% 60.5% 129          0.675%
45-54 97.9% 2.1% 7,477         13.2% 20.4% 66.4% 152          0.415%
55-64 98.3% 1.7% 12,403       10.5% 10.5% 78.9% 209          0.177%
65+ 98.9% 1.1% 11,527       5.0% 10.8% 84.2% 120          0.113%
White 98.2% 1.8% 32,645       11.4% 16.8% 71.8% 570          0.294%
Black 96.9% 3.1% 3,259         16.0% 27.0% 57.0% 100          0.828%
Hispanic 97.0% 3.0% 1,930         17.9% 30.4% 51.8% 56            0.881%
Asian 96.0% 4.0% 479             5.6% 22.2% 72.2% 18            0.835%
No HS 97.4% 2.6% 687             17.6% 23.5% 58.8% 17            0.582%
HS 98.0% 2.0% 9,175         16.7% 17.7% 65.6% 186          0.360%
Some college 97.9% 2.1% 10,401       17.7% 20.5% 61.8% 220          0.433%
2-year 97.9% 2.1% 4,005         15.3% 14.1% 70.6% 85            0.300%
4-year 97.9% 2.1% 9,716         5.6% 23.2% 71.2% 198          0.473%
Post-grad 98.6% 1.4% 6,182         4.5% 10.1% 85.4% 89            0.146%
Were you allowed to vote?
Total
Was there a problem 
with your voter 
registration or voter 
identification when you 
tried to vote?
Total
